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MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/PG/ICL
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SUBJ CT : CIA Responsibilities Related to Disarmament

1. The prospect that a partial agreement between the major powers may emerge from the current disarmament negotiations involving some form or other of mutual inspection, as between the USSR and the US, suggests the need for prompt analysis of CIA's role in the execution of such an agreement as well as the possibilities it may afford for advancing the over-all intelligence mission.

2. Continuous, accurate knowledge of the Soviet military position is the foundation for the successful functioning of any disarmament agreement. This knowledge will in part, but only in part, be afforded by operation of the overt inspection system. It will be the function of intelligence to supplement such knowledge both by gaining additional information and by validating the information overtly obtained. In performance of this mission every practicable human and technical resource must be employed. Moreover, the fact that the Soviet is extremely wary about having masses of foreigners roaming around in their interior means that they will severely limit the size of the inspection force. This in turn dictates that such a force be man-for-man equipped and trained to the highest possible degree.

3. In addition to doing our part to insure that the implementation of any disarmament agreement is as effective and foolproof intelligence-wise as possible, we must examine such an arrangement from the point of view of its contribution to our ability to accomplish our general intelligence mission. We must establish as a matter of policy at the outset that [redacted]

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information that will be obtained by the inspection system on matters not relating to arms and armaments. I am particularly concerned that we devise and procure all possible technical surveillance equipment that can enable us to cover the spaces between inspection posts as against such targets as guided missiles and planes.

4. The problems sketched herein obviously touch on the activities and responsibilities of many of the components of CIA. As addressees I have selected only those that stand out in this respect. I do not believe that the problem can be properly handled unless there is an agency-wide attack on it and a steering committee established to ride herd on the various subdivisions of the effort. In my opinion the SA/PC/DCI's responsibilities encompass at least the planning stage of this effort and I would suggest at a minimum that you call a conference of the recipients of this memorandum to consider how the Agency can best undertake its role in this novel prospect. I feel that it is quite important that we sort out our thinking in CIA before we get involved on the inter-agency level.

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ROBERT AMORY, JR.

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